Multilateralism’s Fractured Core – and the Values That Can Still Hold It Together
After decades in which multilateralism was treated as the natural architecture of international development, its foundations are now visibly eroding. Declining engagement and shrinking core funding have weakened the very mechanisms designed to sustain multi-beneficiary and regional cooperation. What once appeared as a stable, if imperfect, system for collective problem-solving is increasingly giving way to fragmentation and the open assertion of raw power.
This shift is not accidental. It reflects a broader geopolitical reordering in which shared rules, institutions, and values are no longer taken for granted. Multilateral development cooperation has re-entered mainstream debate not as a confident pillar of global governance, but as a system under pressure – questioned, reshaped, and, in some cases, systematically weakened. The erosion may be incremental, but its effects are already redefining how development is financed, framed, and instrumentalized.
Over my 25 years in international development cooperation, I have repeatedly felt the need to pause and reassess my professional approach in response to major global economic, legal, and geopolitical shifts. The past five years have made this pause unavoidable. Grave violations of international law affecting civilian populations and state sovereignty, a global pandemic, the rise of populism corroding international cooperation and humanitarian principles, and the closure of a major donor organisation alongside the emergence of alternative initiatives all point to a profound reordering. These developments mark a critical turning point for multilateralism and its relationship with multi-beneficiary official development assistance, demanding responses that are agile, principled, and effective – anchored not in fear or expediency, but in shared global values and a clear sense of purpose.
A crisis of confidence - and financing
Recent data reveal a structural weakening of multilateral development cooperation. OECD figures show that global official development assistance from OECD Development Assistance Committee members fell by around 6% in real terms in 2024, while core funding for multilateral organisations dropped by nearly 10% - undermining the very resources that sustain long-term engagement and institutional resilience. Although multilateral channels still command a substantial share of development finance, their portion of total ODA has begun to slide, falling to around 43% in 2022. The drift toward bilateral, earmarked, and crisis-driven funding may deliver political visibility, but it fragments action, constrains institutional autonomy, and erodes the logic of coordinated, multi-beneficiary cooperation.
Multilateral organisations are thus trapped in a paradox. They are expected to respond to an expanding catalogue of crises - from climate change to health security - while their most strategic resources stagnate or shrink. The pressure to improvise financially often comes at the cost of coherence, eroding their capacity to support long-term public administration and public financial management reforms across regions.

At the same time, repeated breaches of international law and overt power politics have constrained the ability of global institutions to promote a community of equals. Fragmentation has accelerated through alternative institutional arrangements, where financial leverage, control over resources and technological dominance increasingly replace shared norms. Even the European Union (EU) - the most advanced political expression of multilateralism - has struggled for years with bureaucratic inertia and a persistent democratic deficit, leaving its normative potential underused. l capacity and advancing their path toward becoming learning organizations.
From shared purpose to transaction
In this climate, bilateral development cooperation is increasingly presented as a substitute for multilateralism and thus as a form of multibeneficiary assistance. Driven by transactional logic and strategic leverage, it often lacks a regional or global horizon. Detached from broader frameworks, it risks diluting local ownership and bending development objectives to short-term political gain.
What was once considered unthinkable - treating development cooperation as a transactional instrument - is now widely tolerated. Not because power has become a value, but because of fear of power exercised without restraint. Development cooperation, once rooted in solidarity and shared responsibility, is in danger of becoming another instrument of geopolitical competition.
Lessons from principled diplomacy
The legacy of Budimir Lončar, the Yugoslav and Croatian diplomat who helped strengthen the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, offers a timely reminder that multilateralism was built not on dominance, but on values, trust and diplomacy. Yugoslavia’s role in facilitating the People's Republic of China’s recognition and admission to the United Nations illustrates how influence can stem from principled engagement and coalition-building rather than economic or military dominance.
At the heart of this approach lies a simple insight: equality among states and international organizations is not a gift granted by the strong, but a condition for durable development. History shows that trust and inclusiveness produce more sustainable outcomes than coercion or asymmetrical dependence.
A choice, not a fate
In a polarised world, development cooperation can endure only if grounded in equality, trust, and inclusiveness, with sovereignty as a foundation rather than a barrier. Multilateralism survives not because it is technocratic, but because it is value-based. Within this context, the EU holds a unique responsibility. Despite its limitations, it remains the most advanced political expression of multilateralism. Its enlargement policy, when pursued credibly and with geostrategic intent, remains one of its most powerful tools for promoting rules-based governance through shared norms beyond its borders. The question is no longer whether multilateralism is under pressure, but whether the EU is willing to lead in defending the values that make it possible.