PART II: When Public Administration and Civil Society Work Together: Lessons From the Serbia–Kosovo Normalization Process
This dynamic, the interplay of civil society and administration, is not unique to the Balkans. Across OECD countries, collaborative governance is becoming the new normal. Research on “co-production”, the idea that public services and policies should be designed together with communities and civil society , shows that reforms are more durable, more legitimate, and more effective when they emerge from such partnerships.
Countries such as Canada, Finland, and New Zealand rely on civil society to help redesign healthcare systems, shape environmental policy, reform education, and innovate local governance. In Ukraine, digital governance reforms survived and expanded during wartime precisely because NGOs, tech experts, and public institutions worked together in ways that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.
All of these points to a larger truth: public administration cannot manage today’s challenges alone, and civil society cannot meaningfully change systems without institutional partners. Their strengths are fundamentally complementary. Public administration carries institutional memory, legal mandate, and stability. Civil society brings flexibility, creativity, trust, and direct insight into citizens’ needs. When the two act as adversaries by default, both become weaker. But when they act as partners, even with occasional tension, they can achieve meaningful results.
This is why I find the current narrative about the “death of the NGO sector” misguided. What’s fading is not civil society itself but an outdated model of NGO-ization: organizations operating in isolation, driven by short-term donor cycles, disconnected from local communities and largely ignored by state institutions. The emerging model Is very different. It is one where civil society becomes embedded in wider networks that include administration, universities, businesses, and citizen groups. Organizations become knowledge producers, watchdogs, implementers, and mediators at the same time. They maintain independence while becoming more integrated in policy processes. In the Serbia–Kosovo normalization process, this shift has been especially important. When political leaders failed to advance technical agreements, civil society kept them alive. When public administration lacked guidance, civil society provided data, analysis, and public pressure. When communities felt the consequences of stalled implementation, civil society amplified their concerns. And when international partners needed clarity, civil society often offered the most reliable picture of what was happening on the ground.

Through these interactions, a cautious but meaningful level of trust began to develop. Public institutions opened doors to discussions. Data started to flow more freely. Civil society organizations were invited to working groups and consultations. And although this has not resulted in a perfect process, it has prevented complete stagnation and kept citizens’ needs at the center even when political narratives shifted elsewhere.
What this shows is that meaningful progress is rarely linear or comes through dramatic breakthroughs. It grows through quiet cooperation, long-term engagement, and a willingness to work in the gray zone between politics and policy. It comes from recognizing that governance in divided societies requires more than formal agreements or high-level declarations. It requires relationships, trust, knowledge, and persistent engagement from actors who may not always agree, but who understand that they share responsibility for the public good.
The key lesson is simple: neither public administration nor civil society can operate effectively on its own. The challenges they face are too complex for siloed efforts. The notion that NGOs are fading misses the point entirely. They are not disappearing; they are evolving into a more collaborative and embedded role.
The real danger is not the decline of NGOs but the illusion that the state and civil society can function separately, each guarding its own territory. The future of governance in the Balkans and beyond will depend on how well we learn to work together, to share responsibilities, and to build systems that reflect the needs and capacities of both institutions and communities. The Serbia-Kosovo process shows that progress happens when people inside and outside institutions refuse to accept stagnation as inevitable. That is where genuine change begins, and that is where the future lies.